Barnett v. Obama: Case Dismissed; “A Teachable Moment”
Today, US District Judge David Carter dismissd the eligibility case Barnett v. Obama, ultimately taking into conclusive account the Defense’s motion to dismiss. Judge Carter issued a 30-page opinion, below. “Opposition” site NativeBornCitizen covers a number of media links about this case.
As Mr. Obama has quipped in the past, I think that this opinion provides for a very poignant “teachable moment” regarding the eligibility movement. As a concerned citizen who has officially been opining about the eligibility movement since October 24, 2008, I am going to address some issues brought up in the opinion that are very likely to show that I am an Equal Opportunity Offender ™; when you’re as interested as I am in getting to the truth, you’re bound to upset individuals on all sides of an issue.
Let’s begin on page 23:
…Furthermore, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment sets forth the line of succession “in case ofthe removal of the president from office” or in case of his or her death, resignation, or inability to serve. The Amendment specifies a role for Congress in this process, but no role for the judiciary. The combination of Article I and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment leads the Court to conclude that there is a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue of the removal of a sitting president to a coordinate political department–the Legislative branch.
Judge David Carter (via OustTheUsurper)
In Nixon, the Court also discussed prudential considerations that counseled against judicial review of Senate impeachment proceedings. 506 U.S. at 252 n.4. While Nixon involved the impeachment of a judge, the Court commented on the dangers of judicial review of impeachment of the President:
This lack of finality would manifest itself most dramatically if the President were impeached. The legitimacy of any successor, and hence its effectiveness, would be impaired severely, not merely while the judicial process was running its course, but during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated.
506 U.S. at 236. The potential upheaval to this country that would result from a branch other than Congress ruling on the removal of the President weighs heavily in this case as well. The founders of the Constitution created impeachment to allow an orderly process of transition and succession during which the country can continue to function. Plaintiffs’ request, asking this Court to sweep away the votes of over sixty-nine million Americans with the stroke of a pen and order a new election during which the country would be in a state of turmoil, ignores the Constitution’s processes and separation of powers that were developed by the founders.
Guess what? In this section (and I have attempted to preserve as much of Judge Carter’s context as this non-attorney concerned citizen can muster to make a point), Judge Carter is precisely right about not having the Judiciary actually remove a sitting President, and here’s why.
First of all, anyone would be absolutely hard-pressed to find any constitutional provision whereby the Judiciary is tasked with the power to actually remove a sitting President. After all, do you really want completely unelected individuals being able to almost arbitrarily (depending on the petition before them) make such absolutist decisions with respect to an elected individual? I can absolutely guarantee you that I wouldn’t want to live under such an oligarchy.
Secondly, Judge Carter makes an excellent observation: If the Judiciary were to remove a sitting President for whatever reason, how is that supposed to factor into an orderly succession of government? Remember: all aspects of impeachment are solely under the auspices of the Legislative branch, not the Judicial; the latter are elected, the former are selected. Therefore, what does it say about a government whereby the Legislative confirms the Electoral Votes for a presidential candidate, then the Judiciary removes such an individual, and then the Legislative goes about the process of installing a new President? Surely you can see the illogic — much less the unconstitutionality — of this thought process.
Have I sufficiently offended some of you yet? I have? Good! Because I’ve only gotten started. There’s still time for the rest of you currently unoffended or overjoyed individuals to become offended. Let’s continue.
From page 24:
At oral argument, Plaintiffs Drake and Robinson encouraged the Court to find that the redressability prong has been satisfied on the basis that President Obama’s removal from office would not require impeachment, which they agree is reserved by the Constitution for Congress. Because President Obama never met the constitutional requirements to run for President, they argue, he was never a valid candidate and could not be validly elected. Because he does not validly hold the office of President, he would not be subject to the Constitution’s requirements regarding the removal of a president from office through impeachment. Finally, they reasoned that, because whatever alternative process would be required to remove the President is not set forth in the Constitution, it is not clearly reserved for another branch and is therefore within the province of this Court.
There may very well be a legitimate role for the judiciary to interpret whether the naturalborn citizen requirement has been satisfied in the case of a presidential candidate who has not already won the election and taken office. However, on the day that President Obama took the presidential oath and was sworn in, he became President of the United States. Any removal of him from the presidency must be accomplished through the Constitution’s mechanisms for the removal of a President, either through impeachment or the succession process set forth in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Plaintiffs attempt to subvert this grant of power to Congress by convincing the Court that it should disregard the constitutional procedures in place for the removal of a sitting president. The process for removal of a sitting president–removal for any reason–is within the province of Congress, not the courts.
Guess what (number 2)? Mr. Obama is the President of the United States. I don’t care what you think about the guy, or if you think he has usurped the office (for all anyone knows, that is always a possibility), or whatever. Nevertheless, as far as our Constitution is concerned, he still remains the President. Therefore, to try to impeach the President for no matter what the reason can and never will be under the auspices of the Judiciary.
However — however! — all is absolutely not lost in terms of determining the legitimacy of Mr. Obama to be President. I’ll explain.
You see, as I’ve already profusely commented on my site, I’ve never thought that this issue has been about impeachment; I have always thought this is has been about eligibility; our fervent opposition to questioning this President’s bona fides really need to understand this fine point. As has been quite succinctly laid out by Judge Carter, while it is true that the Judiciary could actually step in and try to impeach the President (I can only imagine what kind of smack-down would politically occur in that respect), the Judiciary should not do this, because that’s not its power, per the Constitution (and we’re about following the Constitution, right? Yes, you are).
OK, then, instead, what should happen, going forward? A few things:
- If an eligibility attorney were to read this post, I would encourage them to consider filing a petition with the Court addressing the ineligibility of the President and — in no uncertain terms — do not mention a thing about impeachment. In fact, the very word “impeachment” should only ever appear in full context that such a petition is not about removing the President. Instead, it is about determining the eligibility of the President. Need evidence? Challenge the authenticity of the Hawaiian Certification of Live Birth — that might be one way to get the actual document into Court — and then challenge its ability to determine eligibility;
- As attorney Leo Donofrio points out in his own take concerning this story, push for a quo warranto action. Immediately after what I last quoted from Judge Carter, there was full and relatively complete discussion concerning this provision as an aspect of office entitlement from within the District of Columbia. It’s interesting to me that this hasn’t really been pushed much at all; it’s perfectly legal and appears to be a potentially useful tool to determine eligibility;
- Push for the federal Legislative branch to seriously consider presidential eligibility, specifically via HR 1503;
- Last but not least, 2012 presents the next time that these types of eligibility cases would be taken “seriously” by the Judiciary; Judge Carter as much said so. And if the opposition thinks that these questions are going to go away by then, well… let’s just let them keep on thinking that way!
In conclusion, I am going to broach another subject about which I’ve previously cooled heated commentary, because it has to do with a private individual. That is the subject of Mr. Siddarth Velamoor having become one of the newest law clerks for Judge Carter (h/t WND).
I had previously said in a comment that Judge Carter was perfectly within his right to bring on board anyone he wished to clerk with him. However, after further thought on the Judge’s move, I am officially considering this a very questionable and potentially unethical move on his part.
Why? As the link to WorldNetDaily details, while Mr. Velamoor may possess a perfectly capable and able legal mind, he hails from the same law firm that has been retained in the past to defend Mr. Obama regarding eligibility lawsuits. Furthermore, it has also been reported that edits on Judge Carter’s Wikipedia page show that the maintainers are clearly biased against “birthers,” which I find in anecdotally very bad taste.
While it is true that the US Attorney’s office has been representing the Defendants in this case and not a specific law firm, I think it can be reasonably assumed that Judge Carter knows from whence Mr. Velamoor comes and should have realized the potential conflict of interest that this could have caused.
All of that being said, I would again urge that if you have something to say concerning the private citizen Mr. Siddarth Velamoor and you simply cannot keep it to yourself, please be civil about your misgivings, else I’ll have to quash any such uncivil discussion ASAP.
Besides — I’ve already said enough in this posting to get virtually everyone mad at me, so remember to keep it civil.
See the following links regarding the eligibility saga:
- The background:
- The questions:
-Phil
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Sue,
I think I’ve already laid out the context of the situation long ago, as you’ve pointed out.
If a clerk is involved with the same law office that is representing a Defendant in a case being heard by the same Judge with whom said individual is clerking, I would consider that “on the face of it” anecdotal evidence that should, at the very least, have been questioned at the time. And that’s why I questioned it.
I don’t see why I should back down from such a question and/or sentiment.
-Phil
“In conclusion, I am going to broach another subject about which I’ve previously cooled heated commentary, because it has to do with a private individual. That is the subject of Mr. Siddarth Velamoor having become one of the newest law clerks for Judge Carter (h/t WND).
“I had previously said in a comment that Judge Carter was perfectly within his right to bring on board anyone he wished to clerk with him. However, after further thought on the Judge’s move, I am officially considering this a very questionable and potentially unethical move on his part.”
Why? As the link to WorldNetDaily details, while Mr. Velamoor may possess a perfectly capable and able legal mind, he hails from the same law firm that has been retained in the past to defend Mr. Obama regarding eligibility lawsuits. Furthermore, it has also been reported that edits on Judge Carter’s Wikipedia page show that the maintainers are clearly biased against “birthers,” which I find in anecdotally very bad taste.
While it is true that the US Attorney’s office has been representing the Defendants in this case and not a specific law firm, I think it can be reasonably assumed that Judge Carter knows from whence Mr. Velamoor comes and should have realized the potential conflict of interest that this could have caused.”
http://www.therightsideoflife.com/
Implying unethical behavior by Judge Carter. Implying conflict of interest, credibility, and ethical behavior of both Judge Carter and law clerk Mr. Siddarth Velamoor based upon what credible evidence?
venqqax,
First, thanks for checking out my site.
Secondly, I apologize if you interpreted what I said to imply that Mr. Obama could never become an illegitimate officeholder; obviously, that is a possibility. Further, I have argued many times on my site that there is no statute of limitations on eligibility, so I don’t think there’s much disagreement there.
The issue is that while the Judiciary has no constitutional authority to impeach a President, they do have the power to determine whether or not an individual meets the classification for natural born citizenship as it relates to eligibility for the presidency. Even in this case, such a ruling would have to be (1) based on current law (of which there currently is none that enforces Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5 and really could only be determined by original documentation) and (2) would still have to be a matter referred to the Legislative branch for potential impeachment proceedings (quo warranto arguments notwithstanding).
Here’s the fear by those who oppose questioning Mr. Obama: since such a situation has never formally occurred in the republic, nobody knows exactly how the situation would be handled RE: all previous executive decisions. The order of succession is pretty clear; the question of previous actions isn’t so much.
-Phil
Perspective from a political scientist because, as you may rightly point out, this is a political more than it is a legal question. You lose my support on Guess What Number 2:
“Mr. Obama is the President of the United States. I don’t care what you think about the guy, or if you think he has usurped the office (for all anyone knows, that is always a possibility), or whatever. Nevertheless, as far as our Constitution is concerned, he still remains the President.”
Not so. Just because he took the oath of office does not suddenly moot the eligibility issue. If he was not eligible, the oath is meaningless. In no way does “our Constitution” state that so long as you get by with the fraud till a certain word is spoken, the rules of said Constitution don’t apply. I have to wonder where such an odd assertion would come from, frankly. If I steal someone else’s identity, are all my transactions prior to being discovered legitimate and binding?
As to the courts: they have willing made themselves the arbiters of the Constitution, with little concern for the lack of such power the document gives them. They took the serving, now they must eat from the plate. Obama’s eligibility is a matter for the court. The problem is Then what? If he is declared ineligible then the court gets hoist by another of its own fictions: Just as separate but equal did not “become” unconstitutional in 1954, Mr. Obama never was president. So now what? True, the courts have no authority to remove a president. What and who governs the fact of a presidency that is vacant? No reason to suppose it would not be Tailwagger Joe. Arguments could be made otherwise regarding succession– over which the courts have no power. But the conclusion that Obama, if ineligible, is in fact and in law NOT the president is inescapable.
“My sources on Article IV…and 28 USC Section 1739 are Article IV and 28 USC Section 1739…they are unambiguous…” [emphasis applied] brygenon
Were the net for sources cast a little wider brygenon might learn that Article IV has been the occasion of numerous SCOTUS decisions interpreting its ambiguity, meaning, and purview. Furthermore, if Article IV’s enabling statutes (28 USC Section 1738 and 1739) are indeed unambiguous and fixed in their meaning this embarrassingly dethunks brygenon’s opinion of their effect. While SCOTUS may view the Constitution as a document whose meanings evolve over time it is quite unambiguous with regard to statutes. For example, in Univ. of Tennessee v Elliott (1986) SCOTUS held that “28 U.S.C. § 1738, which accords a state court judgment the same full faith and credit in federal courts as it would have in the State’s courts, does not require that federal courts be bound by the unreviewed findings of state administrative agencies…because § 1738 antedates [precedes] the development of administrative agencies…” Using this standard, when §1738’s sibling 28 USC 1739 was enacted in 1804 a system of state birth records did not exist and was not considered necessary. Given Congress could not have intended 28 USC 1739 to apply to something non-existent and unnecessary, following SCOTUS’ logic a birth certificate is not a “record” under 28 USC 1739.
Even assuming, contrary to brygenon, that 28 USC Section 1739 is ambiguous in its effect, Full Faith and Credit bestows only the credit a record is given under local law and for Obama’s COLB this does not even amount to a prima facie presumption. Given Hawaii DoH admit that Obama’s vital records involve a delayed filing and amendment, which should by law appear on the COLB but are mysteriously and illegally absent, the most brygenon could hope for is that Obama’s COLB is subjected to the most rigorous forensic investigation.
[NO Hawaii COLB...has been authenticated…(under) 28 USC 1739] “Except that [hyperlink to photo of alleged COLB stamps] ” brygenon
28 USC Section 1739 in pertinent part allows “records or books [to be] proved or admitted by the attestation of the custodian…together with a certificate of a judge…or of the Governor, or secretary of state, the chancellor or keeper of the great seal…If the certificate is given by a judge, it shall be further authenticated by the clerk or prothonotary of the court, who shall certify, under his hand and the seal of his office…or, if [the certificate is] given by such Governor, secretary, chancellor, or keeper of the great seal, it shall be under the great seal of the State… ” [emphasis applied]
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “attest” as when “a certifying officer gives assurance of the genuineness and correctness of a copy…which has been examined and compared with the original [and] signed by the person who examined it.” http://tinyurl.com/BLD-Attest-p103
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “certificate” as “A written assurance, or official representation, that some act has or has not been done, or some event occurred, or some legal formality been complied with.” http://tinyurl.com/BLD-Certate-p183
Brewer’s Dictionary defines “Hand and Seal” as “When writing was limited to a few clerks, documents were authenticated by the impression of the hand dipped in ink, and then the seal was duly appended. As dipping the hand in ink was dirty, the impression of the thumb was substituted. We are informed that “scores of old English and French deeds still exist in which such `signatures’ appear.” Subsequently the name was written, and this writing was called ‘the hand’.” http://tinyurl.com/BD-H-S-p576
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “hand” as “a person’s signature.” http://tinyurl.com/BLD-Hand-p560
The phrase “under his hand and the seal of his office” in 28 USC Section 1739 means “to certify with both handwritten signature and seal“.
The procedure under 28 USC Section 1739 is: 1. Attestation by the Custodian AND… 2. A Judge’s certificate OR a State Officer’s certificate. 3 If a Judge’s certificate THEN EITHER a Clerk’s or Prothonotary’s certificate of hand and seal OR a State Officer’s certificate of hand and seal.
Where in the online images of Obama’s purported COLB do we observe the written certificates (plural) and signatures (plural) from among these officers (custodian, judge, governor, secretary of state, the chancellor or keeper of the great seal, clerk or prothonotary of the court) as stipulated by 28 USC Section 1739? Nowhere, simply nowhere. Registrar Onaka’s machine stamped facsimile and rubric does not conform to the statute’s requirement that the custodian’s signature should attest that a non-routine examination and comparison of a specific copy with its original has occurred; a facsimile and rubric which is machine stamped onto tens of thousands of COLBs does not provide the guarantee both the statute and evidence demand that such a non-routine examination and comparison ever really happened.
Thus, even assuming hypothetically that brygenon were right and 28 USC Section 1739 is the correct instrument to authenticate Obama’s COLB, based on the foregoing, that COLB (if it exists) should not be given “Full Faith and Credit”. Only sourced authorities, and not one of brygenon’s deceitful or kookological cringe theories, can unmake this conclusion. Until then brygenon remains seriously dethunked.
“[FRE 902(1)] does exactly what I said…[and]…COLB is not admitted as hearsay” brygenon
I thought brygenon had resiled from this kookological cringe theory, but apparently militant true belief is impervious to rationality. The argument made to brygenon before, substantiated by judicial and scholarly authorities and not rebutted, is that being both an electronic record and a vital record Obama’s COLB is hearsay potentially admissible under FRE Rules 902(4) and 803(9), but due to inherent hearsay within hearsay (i.e. references to the originating 1961 Certificate and its serial number) the COLB is inadmissible under any FRE Rule. Rather than cite more authorities whom brygenon is going to wilfully ignore, I invite brygenon to answer these questions:
1 Has a birth certificate ever been authenticated via the FRE, then brought into evidence, as something other than a certified copy of a public record under Rule 902(4)?
2 Is hearsay an oral or written statement, other than one made by a person while testifying at a trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted?
3 Is a Hawaii COLB, when offered to a court as evidence to prove a case, a person testifying at a trial or hearing?
4 Has a vital record, when its proponent claims that the information contained therein is true and is submitted to prove a case, ever been admitted into evidence as something other than hearsay?
5 Is a Hawaii COLB an electronically stored record?
6 Are electronically stored records hearsay?
7 When a written statement is deemed hearsay should any separate and distinct hearsay within hearsay elements inside the written statement also be required to satisfy a hearsay Rule ?
8 Should hearsay within hearsay elements inside a written statement which establish its relevance and probity be ruled inadmissible, is the entire written statement inadmissible?
9 Would attorneys offer as evidence in court Obama’s COLB and the information it contains to prove the truth of his case i.e. that he was born in Hawaii?
10 What evidence apart from his COLB (if it exists) would Obama’s attorneys offer to prove the truth of his case?
Unless brygenon answers these questions quoting judicial or scholarly authorities in support it will be presumed that brygenon is either ignorant of, or cannot find, authorities which support brygenon’s position, and that position must fail and so is dethunked. Any reply without supporting authorities will be considered deceitful or kookological cringe theory.
“So are you retracting quoting ‘instantly authenticates’ to me or not?” brygenon
Read back very carefully my comments below. At no point did I quote brygenon as using the phrase “instantly authenticates”; what seems to brygenon a quote is, rather, a interrogative quotation by brygenon of my original paraphrasis that had been placed within sceptical inverted commas, which quotation by brygenon I used as a reference point. Nothing else.
To the substance of the matter: when brygenon writes, for example, “Obama’s birth certificate [actually CertificATION of Live Birth] is stamped with an attestation by the record keeper and embossed with the great seal of the state…Records so proven enjoy the same faith and credit…” it is unequivocally stated that the machine stamped “attestation” and “embossing” placed upon the CertificATION have so proven (meaning: have “in this way” or “by such means” or “for that reason” proven) the COLB to enjoy Full Faith and Credit under Article IV and 28 USC Section 1739.
If brygenon does not really mean that Full Faith and Credit is proven at the instant of “attestation” and “embossing“, when does Obama’s COLB partake of Full Faith and Credit, if at all? And if brygenon does intend that Full Faith and Credit is to be attributed to Obama’s CertificATION at the instant of “attestation” and “embossing“, this must surely be a procedure that “instantly authenticates” Obama’s COLB, given such “attestation” and “embossing” occur simultaneously with the first instant of its official existence? If brygenon has not intended for us to understand these words in this way, please state clearly the correct meaning. Otherwise brygenon’s merely conjectural authentication of Obama’s COLB under Article IV and 28 USC Section 1739 at the first instant of its official existence is taken adverbially to occur “instantly“, meaning “at once, without delay or hesitation; with no time intervening“; that is, according to brygenon and merely conjecturally, it “instantly authenticates” (sceptical inverted commas applied).
“[Okubo] added that the U.S. Supreme Court has recognized the state’s current certification of live birth ‘as an official birth certificate meeting all federal and other requirements’.” brygenon
That’s really very funny. Perhaps brygenon would like to quote and explain the mysterious SCOTUS decisions insinuated by Okubo. Okubo and the department she represents have been acting contrary to Hawaii law for months (please ask!) so her credibility when it comes to the law is non-existent. Any reply in defense of Okubo without supporting authorities will be considered deceitful or kookological cringe theory.
“court[s]…have already recognized, albeit in dicta, that Obama released his birth certificate.” brygenon
I wrote below: “right now Obama has not proved his US citizenship nor his Presidential eligibility in a form admissible as evidence in any court.”
brygenon replied: “Federal court rulings have already recognized, albeit in dicta, that Obama released his birth certificate.”
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “dicta” as the “opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the court, and, made without argument, or full consideration of the point, are not the professed deliberate determinations of the judge himself. Obiter dicta are such opinions uttered by the way, not upon the point or question pending, as if turning aside for the time from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects.” http://tinyurl.com/BLD-Dicta-p366
Given that Obama has not produced his COLB (if it exists) in any court, how does brygenon’s allusion to “dicta” rebut my conclusion “Obama has not proved…in a form admissible as evidence in any court”? brygenon has said in effect that “courts have already recognized, albeit in a form not admissible as evidence in any court etc….”. To a reasonable person this agreement surely concedes the point; however brygenon, under the influence of a kookological cringe theory, seems unable to perceive the irrationality of the counterclaim or means to put over a false impression.
“California attorney Orly Taitz, facing a $20,000 sanction from the federal judge presiding over the Mark Shelnutt trial, said on the payment’s deadline that she had no intention of paying.
‘Absolutely not,’ Taitz said Thursday afternoon when asked whether she would pay. ‘I have filed an appeal. It was a complete abuse of power.’”
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/news/breaking_news/story/906241.html
_____________________
Better hope those assets are well hidden. U.S. DOJ is now authorized to initiate collection procedures.
Vattel and the two-citizen parent theory rejected by the Indiana Court of Appeals:
“The Plaintiffs do not mention the above United States Supreme Court authority in their complaint or brief; they primarily rely instead on an eighteenth century treatise and quotations of Members of Congress made during the nineteenth century. To the extent that these authorities conflict with the United States Supreme Court‟s interpretation of what it means to be a natural born citizen, we believe that the Plaintiffs‟ arguments fall under the category of “conclusory, non-factual assertions or legal conclusions” that we need not accept as true when reviewing the grant of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”
Ankeny, Slip Op. at 18
Steve and Bill will be passing the hat to finance their appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court. Pony up, birthers.
With regard to President Barack Obama, the Plaintiffs posit that because his father was a citizen of the United Kingdom, President Obama is constitutionally ineligible to assume the Office of the President.
The bases of the Plaintiffs‟ arguments come from such sources as FactCheck.org, The Rocky Mountain News, an eighteenth century treatise by Emmerich de Vattel titled “The Law of Nations,” and various citations to nineteenth century congressional debate.11 For the reasons stated below, we hold that the Plaintiffs‟ arguments fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and that therefore the trial court did not err in dismissing the Plaintiffs‟ complaint.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution governs who is a citizen of the United States. It provides that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. Article II has a special requirement to assume the Presidency: that the person be a “natural born Citizen.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4. The United States Supreme Court has read these two provisions in tandem and held that “[t]hus new citizens may be born or they may be created by naturalization.” Minor v. Happersett, 88 (21 Wall.) U.S. 162, 167 (1874). In Minor, written only six years after the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, the Court observed that:
The Constitution does not, in words, say who shall be natural-born citizens. Resort must be had elsewhere to ascertain that. At common-law, with the nomenclature of which the framers of the Constitution were familiar, it was never doubted that all children born in a country of parents who were its citizens became themselves, upon their birth, citizens also. These were natives, or natural-born citizens, as distinguished from aliens or foreigners. Some authorities go further and include as citizens children born within the jurisdiction without reference to the citizenship of their parents. As to this class there have been doubts, but never as to the first. For the purposes of this case it is not necessary to solve these doubts.
Id. at 167-168. Thus, the Court left open the issue of whether a person who is born within the United States of alien parents is considered a natural born citizen.
Then, in U.S. v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S. Ct. 456 (1898), the United States Supreme Court confronted the question of “whether a child born in the United States, of parents of Chinese descent, who at the time of his birth are subject to the emperor of China . . . becomes at the time of his birth a citizen of the United States, by virtue of the first clause of the fourteenth amendment . . . .” 169 U.S. at 653, 18 S. Ct. at 458. We find this case instructive. The Court in Wong Kim Ark reaffirmed Minor in that the meaning of the words “citizen of the United States” and “natural-born citizen of the United States” “must be interpreted in the light of the common law, the principles and history of which were familiarly known to the framers of the constitution.” Id. at 654, 18 S. Ct. at 459. They noted that “[t]he interpretation of the constitution of the United States is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to be read in the light of its history.” Id. at 655, 18 S. Ct. at 459 (quoting Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465, 478, 8 S. Ct. 564, 569 (1888)).
* * *
It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, and the jurisdiction of the English sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.
III. The same rule was in force in all the English colonies upon this continent down to the time of the Declaration of Independence, and in the United States afterwards, and continued to prevail under the constitution as originally established.
Id. at 655-658, 18 S. Ct. at 459-460.
Also, as quoted in Wong Kim Ark, Justice Joseph Story once declared in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailors’ Snug Harbor, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 99 (1830), that “Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children, even of aliens, born in a country, while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government, and owing a temporary allegiance thereto, are subjects by birth.” Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. at 660, 18 S. Ct. at 461 (quoting Inglis, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 164 (Story, J., concurring)).
* * *
The Court in Wong Kim Ark also cited authority which notes that:
All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. We find no warrant for the opinion that this great principle of the common law has ever been changed in the United States. It has always obtained here with the same vigor, and subject only to the same exceptions, since as before the Revolution.
Id. at 662-663, 18 S. Ct. at 462 (quotations and citations omitted). The Court held that Mr. Wong Kim Ark was a citizen of the United States “at the time of his birth.” Id. at 705, 18 S. Ct. at 478.
Based upon the language of Article II, Section 1, Clause 4 and the guidance provided by Wong Kim Ark, we conclude that persons born within the borders of the United States are “natural born Citizens” for Article II, Section 1 purposes, regardless of the citizenship of their parents. Just as a person “born within the British dominions [was] a natural-born British subject” at the time of the framing of the U.S. Constitution, so too were those “born in the allegiance of the United States [] natural-born citizens.”
Ankeny, passim.