Hollister Files Notice of Appeal to DC Circuit; Other “Natural Born Citizen” Interpretations
Yesterday, Gregory Hollister, Plaintiff in Hollister v. Soetoro, had appealed his case to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
FreeRepublic.com shows the current docket info:
03/17/2009 US CIVIL CASE docketed. [09-5080]
03/17/2009 NOTICE OF APPEAL filed  by Mr. Gregory S. Hollister of decision of U.S. District Court. [09-5080]
03/18/2009 Open Document CLERK’S ORDER filed  directing party to file initial submissions: APPELLANT docketing statement due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT certificate as to parties, etc. due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT statement of issues due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT underlying decision due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT deferred appendix statement due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT notice of appearance due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT transcript status report due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT procedural motions due 04/17/2009. APPELLANT dispositive motions due 05/04/2009; directing party to file initial submissions: APPELLEE certificate as to parties, etc. due 04/17/2009. APPELLEE entry of appearance due 04/17/2009. APPELLEE procedural motions due 04/17/2009. APPELLEE dispositive motions due 05/04/2009 [09-5080]
Therefore, key dates for the appeal are April 17 and May 4, 2009.
A current listing of eligibility lawsuits can be found here.
What follows are further opinions from friends of this blog…
The blogger at RationalLiberty provides an interesting and rather thorough viewpoint on “The Illegitimate President.” Here’s a part from the beginning of the posting:
At the time of the adoption of our Constitution, there was only one well-known definition of natural-born citizen that was also consistent with the principles of a free society and a republican government. This definition was a result of several generations of natural law theory and international scholarship concerning the rights of man and the legitimate powers of government. The man who wrote this definition was one of the most respected and well-known authorities on national law during the creation of our federal government. His name was Emerich de Vattel and his work was The Law of Nations – a work that is one of the most quoted treatises by American legal authorities concerning national law.
According to Vattel, natural-born citizens are “those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.” This meaning has been reiterated by other government authorities, including the author of the 14th Amendment to our Constitution, Representative John Bingham, and the Supreme Court in the case Minor v. Happersett.
Also, here’s a similar viewpoint from another concerned citizen:
Under the same reasoning of the SCOTUS in FONG, the SCOTUS will consider Vattel’s Law of Nations, as well as other learned works, to determine the meaning of “natural born citizen” as the founding fathers intended it to mean within Article II of the Constitution of the United States. If they want, they may even consider “Eminent English judges, sitting in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council”.
FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. WONG QUAN V. UNITED STATES. LEE JOE V. UNITED STATES., 13 S. Ct. 1016, 149 U.S. 698 (U.S. 05/15/1893)
 SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
 The right of a nation to expel or deport foreigners, who have not been naturalized or taken any steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into the country.
 This is clearly affirmed in dispatches referred to by the court in Chae Chan Ping’s case. In 1856, Mr. Marcy wrote: “Every society possesses the undoubted right to determine who shall compose its members, and it is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war. A memorable example of the exercise of this power in time of peace was the passage of the alien law of the United States in the year 1798.” In 1869, Mr. Fish wrote: “The control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from its territory persons who and dangerous to the peace of the State, are too clearly within the essential attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested.” Wharton’s International Law Digest, § 206; 130 U.S. 607.
 The statements of leading commentators on the law of nations are to the same effect.
 Vattel says: ”Every nation has the right to refuse to admit a foreigner into the country, when he cannot enter without putting the nation in evident danger, or doing it a manifest injury. What it owes to itself, the care of its own safety, gives it this right; and in virtue of its natural liberty, it belongs to the nation to judge whether its circumstances will or will not justify the admission of the foreigner.” “Thus, also, it has a right to send them elsewhere, if it has just cause to fear that they will corrupt the manners of the citizens; that they will create religious disturbances, or occasion any other disorder, contrary to the public safety. In a word, it has a right, and is even obliged, in this respect, to follow the rules which prudence dictates.” Vattel’s Law of Nations, lib. 1, c. 19, §§ 230, 231.
 Ortolan says: ”The government of each state has always the right to compel foreigners who are found within its territory to go away, by having them taken to the frontier. This right is based on the fact that, the foreigner not making part of the nation, his individual reception into the territory is matter of pure permission, of simple tolerance, and creates no obligation. The exercise of this right may be subjected, doubtless, to certain forms by the domestic laws of each country; but the right exists none the less, universally recognized and put in force. In France, no special form is now prescribed in this matter; the exercise of this right of expulsion is wholly left to the executive power.” Ortolan, Diplomatie de la Mer, lib. 2, c. 14, (4th ed.) p. 297.
 Phillimore says: ”It is a received maxim of international law, that the government of a state may prohibit the entrance of strangers into the country, and may therefore regulate the conditions under which they shall be allowed to remain in it, or may require any compel their departure from it.” 1 Phillimore’s International Law, (3d ed.) c. 10, § 220.
 Bar says: ”Banishment and extradition must not be confounded. The former is simply a question of expediency and humanity, since no state is bound to receive all foreigners, although, perhaps, to exclude all would be to say good-bye to the international union of all civilized states; and although in some states, such as England, strangers can only be expelled by means of special acts of the legislative power, no state has renounced its right to expel them, as is shown by the alien bills which the government of England has at times used to invest itself with the right of expulsion.” “Banishment is regulated by rules of expediency and humanity, and is a matter for the police of the state. No doubt the police can apprehend any foreigner who refuses to quit the country in spite of authoritative orders to do so, and convey him to the frontier.” Bar’s International Law, (Gillespie’s ed. 1883) 708 note, 711.
 In the passages just quoted from Gillespie’s translation of Bar, “banishment” is evidently used in the sense of expulsion or deportation by the political authority on the ground of expediency, and not in the sense of transportation or exile by way of punishment for crime. Strictly speaking, “transportation,” “extradition” and “deportation,” although each has the effect of removing a person from the country, are different things, and have different purposes. “Transportation” is by way of punishment of one convicted of an offence against the laws of the country. “Extradition” is the surrender to another country of one accused of an offence against its laws, there to be tried, and, if found guilty, punished. “Deportation” is the removal of an alien out of the country, simply because his presence is deemed inconsistent with the public welfare, and without any punishment being imposed or contemplated, either under the laws of the country out of which he is sent, or under those of the country to which he is taken.
 In England, the only question that has ever been made in regard to the power to expel aliens has been whether it could be exercised by the King without the consent of Parliament. It was formerly exercised by the King, but in later times by Parliament, which passed several acts on the subject between 1793 and 1848. 2 Inst. 57; 1 Chalmers Opinions, 26; 1 Bl. Com. 260; Chitty on the Prerogative, 49; 1 Phillimore, c. 10, § 220 and note; 30 Parl. Hist. 157, 167, 188, 217, 229; 34 Hansard Parl. Deb. (1st series) 441, 445, 471, 1065-1071; 6 Law Quart. Rev. 27.
 Eminent English judges, sitting in the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, have gone very far in supporting the exclusion or expulsion, by the executive authority of a colony, of aliens having no absolute right to enter its territory or to remain therein.
Clearly, viewpoints will continue to be bandied about until such time as either the Legislative, Executive and/or Judicial branches of our constitutional republic comes up with a definitive answer.
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