Your effort in reading my questions were much appreciated, as well as your thoughtful responses. I agree on all of your posted answers, they are all rational. I can’t help but believe that a mechanism for candidate eligibility in government must now become an essential part of the election process. The idea about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in government or individuals is really much about grey, and when and where.

Thank you for the kind words and for reading my site. It’s all a group effort.

-Phil

Your effort in reading my questions were much appreciated, as well as your thoughtful responses. I agree on all of your posted answers, they are all rational. I can’t help but believe that a mechanism for candidate eligibility in government must now become an essential part of the election process. The idea about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in government or individuals is really much about grey, and when and where.

Your effort in reading my questions were much appreciated, as well as your thoughtful responses. I agree on all of your posted answers, they are all rational. I can’t help but believe that a mechanism for candidate eligibility in government must now become an essential part of the election process. The idea about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ in government or individuals is really much about grey, and when and where.

Did the 14th Amendment have language changing the original Constitutional requirement for POTUS?

Let’s take a look at the relevant Section 1 of the 14th Amendment:

Section. 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

For me, simply on the face of it, I see nothing that states anything about eligibility issues. Rather, I simply see a re-affirmation of rights of citizens by virtue of their being a citizen of the US. Therefore, simply based on the wording of this Section, I see absolutely nothing that changes the meaning or content of Article 2, Section 1, Clause 5 of the Constitution.

Why did the DNC and Obama deliberately seal records, and fight vigorously to keep records sealed, if Obama is indeed legally qualified to be POTUS?

Going back to what was arguably the original suit in all of this, Berg v. Obama (at the federal Court in Philly with Judge Surrick), the fact that the DNC fought against questioning the nominee (at the time) on the grounds of essentially saying, “of course he’s an American citizen” is what made me think there was something to the eligibility issue, if for no other reason than there is absolutely no legal enforcement of eligibility at this time (and if Mr. Obama is a constitutional lawyer, then I can safely assume that he has every reason to know this).

Truly, I continue to enjoy your website.

Thanks for the kind words. It’s no site without readers, and as much as I disagree with them, I’m overjoyed that adversaries to my viewpoints quite frequently view this site and comment. I also Tweet on Twitter at “Phil_GA”.

When the system can be twisted to deny the public basic access to eligibility information for a POTUS, do we have a government of, by, and for the people? In your opinion, what form government do we actually live under now?

Always remember that the system, per se, is not what is “bad” or “evil;” it is what it is. It is the people currently holding various official titles that are at fault for those things that are perpetuating “bad” or “evil” behaviors from within. Therefore, while we continue to have a constitutional republic, we, the People, must be much more vigilant in holding those who govern us accountable.

-Phil

I seem to see the same arguments back and forth regarding Obama and Natural Born. The legal opinions of the Obots are all backed upon the legal interpretation of the 14th amendment, as to what qualifies for US citizenship. So I am going to ask a few questions that I hope you can answer for everyone on the board.

Did the 14th Amendment have language changing the original Constitutional requirement for POTUS? Can an Amendment ‘define or change’ an original Constitutional statement without specifically addressing it in language? Is there precedence for an Amendment, without specific language, changing the original Constitution? If the 14th Amendment did not contain language changing the original Constitutional requirements, which requirements/law is still in effect? Should the original Constitutional requirement for Natural Born be present in the original form, would it be based upon Legal Definition of Natural Born in 1790? Whose legal definition of Natural born was being used in 1790 in the US?

Why did the DNC and Obama deliberately seal records, and fight vigorously to keep records sealed, if Obama is indeed legally qualified to be POTUS? What purpose does it serve to keep Obama’s records sealed if he is qualified under the ‘14th Amendment’ interpretation as the Obots claim? Has anyone posted a reasonable explanation to keep Obama’s records sealed?

Truly, I continue to enjoy your website. I believe that it has been reasonably settled that no pre-election process to confirm POTUS eligibility exists, and likely no post election solution save a quo warrant. My last two questions are perhaps the most difficult to contemplate. When the system can be twisted to deny the public basic access to eligibility information for a POTUS, do we have a government of, by, and for the people? In your opinion, what form government do we actually live under now?

Benjamin Franklin, on behalf of Congress, wrote to Charles Dumas (Swiss Journalist) thanking him for copies of Vattel’s The Law of Nations. One copy was given to Congress. This letter was signed by John Dickenson and John Jay as well. Website References below:

http://www.franklinpapers.org/franklin/framedNames.jsp

http://www.schillerinstitute.org/fid_97-01/971_vattel.html

Seems clear you are going to keep saying the same thing regardless of the facts. You can keep citing two Justices who cited Vattel on issues other than who is a citizen at birth and try to argue that they will look to Vattel when defining a citizen at birth. Week argument generally, but significantly weaker considering that both these Justices rejected Vattel’s view of natives or indigenes in other decisions in favor of Blackstone’s view. You do realize the Justices have cited Blackstone about a thousand more times than Vattel. Please cite any authority in the pre-reconstruction period that defines natural born or native in terms of Vattel rather than Blackstone when actually dealing with who is a citizen at birth in the US and not some peripheral issues under international law. Here is some authority you might want to look at:

“It is an established maxim that birth is a criterion of allegiance. Birth however derives its force sometimes from place and sometimes from parentage, but in general place is the most certain criterion; it is what applies in the United States; it will therefore be unnecessary to investigate any other.” James Madison, The Founders’ Constitution Volume 2, Article 1, Section 2, Clause 2, Document 6

“Therefore every person born within the United States, its territories or districts, whether the parents are citizens or aliens, is a natural born citizen in the sense of the Constitution, and entitled to all the rights and privileges appertaining to that capacity.” William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States (1829)

“That provision in the constitution which requires that the president shall be a native-born citizen (unless he were a citizen of the United States when the constitution was adopted,) is a happy means of security against foreign influence,… A very respectable political writer makes the following pertinent remarks upon this subject. “Prior to the adoption of the constitution, the people inhabiting the different states might be divided into two classes: natural born citizens, or those born within the state, and aliens, or such as were born out of it. St. George Tucker, BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES (1803)

As the President is required to be a native citizen of the United States…and if at common law, all human beings born within the ligeance of the King, and under the King’s obedience, were natural-born subjects, and not aliens, I do not perceive why this doctrine does not apply to these United States, in all cases in which there is no express constitutional or statute declaration to the contrary. . . . Subject and citizen are, in a degree, convertible terms as applied to natives, and though the term citizen seems to be appropriate to republican freemen, yet we are, equally with the inhabitants of all other countries, subjects, for we are equally bound by allegiance and subjection to the government and law of the land.” James Kent, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW (1826)

“The term citizen, was used in the constitution as a word, the meaning of which was already established and well understood. And the constitution itself contains a direct recognition of the subsisting common law principle, in the section which defines the qualification of the President… The only standard which then existed, of a natural born citizen, was the rule of the common law, and no different standard has been adopted since. Suppose a person should be elected President who was native born, but of alien parents, could there be any reasonable doubt that he was eligible under the constitution? I think not. ” Lynch vs. Clarke (NY 1844)

“The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, ‘a natural-born citizen.’ It thus assumes that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which referred citizenship to the place of birth.” Justice Curtis, dissenting, Dredd Scott v. Sandford,, 60 U.S. 393 (1857).

“Citizens are either native born or naturalized. Native citizens may fill any office; naturalized citizens may be elected or appointed to any office under the constitution of the United States, except the office of president and vice-president.” Bouvier Law Dictionary 1856

“The first section of the second article of the Constitution uses the language, “a natural-born citizen.” In these [illegible] that citizenship may be acquired by birth. Undoubtedly, this language of the Constitution was used in reference to that principle of public law, well understood in this country at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, which [conferred] citizenship to the place of birth. At the Declaration of Independence, and ever since, the received general definition has been, in conformity with the common law, that free persons born within either of the colonies were subjects of the King; that by the Declaration of Independence, and the subsequent acquisition of sovereignty by the several States, all such persons ceased to be subjects, and became citizens of the several States, except so far as some of them were disfranchised by the legislative power of the states, or availed themselves, reasonably, of the right to adhere to the British Crown in the civil conte[x]t and thus to continue British Subjects.” John Codman Hurd, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES (1858)

“The Constitution itself does not make the citizens, (it is. in fact,made by them.) It only intends and recognizes such of them as are natural—home-born—and provides for the naturalization of such of them as were alien—foreign-born—making the latter, as far as nature will allow, like the former. …” Opinion of Citizenship, Bates (1862)

“All persons born in the allegiance of the king are natural-born subjects, and all persons born in the allegiance of the United States are natural-born citizens. Birth and allegiance go together. Such is the rule of the common law, and it is the common law of this country, as well as of England. There are two exceptions, and only two, to the universality of its application. The children of ambassadors are in theory born in the allegiance of the powers the ambassadors represent, and slaves, in legal contemplation, are property, and not persons.” Justice Swayne, United States v. Rhodes, 1 Abbott, US 28 (Cir. Ct. Ky 1866)

“A Natural Born Citizen.” — Not made by law or otherwise, but born… “Natural Born Citizen” recognizes and reaffirms the universal principle common to all nations, and as old as political society, that the people born to a country do constitute the nation, and, as individual, are natural members of the body politic…Every person born in the country is, at the moment of birth, prima facie a citizen.” George Washington Paschal, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES DEFINED AND CAREFULLY ANNOTATED (1868)

“Every person born within the United States, its Territories, or districts, whether the parents are citizens or aliens, is a natural-born citizen of the United States in the sense of the Constitution…Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England; that is, within the ligeance, or, as it is generally called, the allegiance of the King; and aliens are such as are born out of it.” …… “It makes a man a subject in England, and a citizen here, and is, as Blackstone declares, ‘founded in reason and the nature of government’ … The English Law made no distinction … in declaring that all persons born within its jurisdiction are natural-born subjects. This law bound the colonies before the revolution, and was not changed afterward.” Rep. Wilson, 1866 Civil Rights Act debates. 10 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., lst Sess. 1115 (1866); id. at 1117 (same debates as Bingham’s statements)

“So, also, any person born of a foreign father in any place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, may be a natural- born American citizen, if he choose.” Albert Orville Wright, AN EXPOSITION ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (31st Ed.) (1888).

That the father and mother of the demandant were British born subjects is admitted. If he was born before 4 July, 1776, it is as clear that he was born a British subject. If he was born after 4 July, 1776, and before 15 September, 1776, he was born an American citizen, whether his parents were at the time of his birth British subjects or American citizens. Nothing is better settled at the common law than the doctrine that the children even of aliens born in a country while the parents are resident there under the protection of the government and owing a temporary allegiance thereto are subjects by birth. Justice Story, Inglis v. Sailors’ Snug Harbor, (1830) 3 Pet. 99.

“It thus clearly appears that by the law of England for the last three centuries, beginning before the settlement of this country, and continuing to the present day, aliens, while residing in the dominions possessed by the crown of England, were within the allegiance, the obedience, the faith or loyalty, the protection, the power, and the jurisdiction of the English sovereign; and therefore every child born in England of alien parents was a natural-born subject, unless the child of an ambassador or other diplomatic agent of a foreign state, or of an alien enemy in hostile occupation of the place where the child was born.” U.S. v. WONG KIM ARK, 169 U.S. 649 (1898)

The SCOTUS in THE VENUS, 12 U.S. 253 (1814), quotes Vattel’s Law of Nations and specifically quotes Vattel’s definition of citizens: “the citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”

Moreover, The SCOTUS in FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. WONG QUAN V. UNITED STATES. LEE JOE V. UNITED STATES., 13 S. Ct. 1016, 149 U.S. 698 (U.S. 05/15/1893), specifically referenced THE VENUS court’s reference to Vattel, and understood from THE VENUS court’s reference to Vattel that NATIVES, or INDIGENES, were NATIVE CITIZENS. Please note that a NATIVE CITIZEN is the same as a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN.

To reiterate, the SCOTUS relied upon Vattel as THE AUTORITY in THE VENUS when they defined the citizenship status of a “domicil”.

THE VENUS court specifically stated that Vattel “is more explicit and more satisfactory on it [the subject of citizenship] than any other whose work has fallen into my hands”. Then, THE VENUS court quoted Vattel’s definition of citizens and stated, “the citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”

This CONFIRMS that the SCOTUS will consider Vattel as THE AUTHORIY on the subject of citizenship when they determine the meaning of “natural born citizen” as the framers of the Constitution intended it to mean.

Please note that according to THE VENUS and FONG, the NATIVES, or INDIGENES, or NATIVE CITIZENS, who are the “NATURAL BORN CITIZENS” are “those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”

Obama does NOT meet this definition. Hence, per the precedence of the SCOTUS in THE VENUS, and per the precedence of the SCOTUS in FONG, Obama is NOT a NATIVE, or INDIGENE, or NATIVE CITIZEN, or NATURAL BORN CITIZEN of the United States, and thus Obama is NOT eligible to be the President of the United States.

The FONG court actually cited The Venus court’s reference to Vattel with regard to the definition of a “domicil”, and stated the following:

…in the case of The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253, 278: “The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country, for a special purpose, and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel, domicil, which he defines to be ‘a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there.’ Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society, at least a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of an inferior order from the native citizens; but is, nevertheless, united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicil, he continues, is not established, unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. (Vatt. pp. 92, 93.)”

To reiterate, this CONFIRMS that the SCOTUS will consider Vattel as THE AUTHORIY on the subject of citizenship, as they did when they detrermined the definition of “domicil” in THE VENUS, when they determine the meaning of “natural born citizen” as the framers of the Constitution intended it to mean when they drafted Article II of the Constitution.

Simply put, Obama is NOT Constitutionally qualified to be the President of the United States.

“Mr. Merrell says one of the marshals cited “some obscure law which made it illegal to say anything that caused ‘emotional distress’ to a federal judge.””

“While we do not know the contents of the letter, perhaps the dear Judge doesn’t like anyone questioning his authority? I don’t know what I find more fascinating — that the Judge was clearly bothered by the letter (did he actually take the time to read it?) or that federal authorities visited a private citizen under the auspices of the Judge apparently having thin skin (after all, the two marshals reportedly didn’t do anything but “cite some obscure law,” and that was it).”

I think this might be the so called “obscure law.”
http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/18/usc_sec_18_00000115—-000-.html
TITLE 18 > PART I > CHAPTER 7 > § 115Prev | Next § 115. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member

Now, how current is this so called “obscure law?”
§ 115. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a family member

“Title 18 of the US Code as currently published by the US Government reflects the laws passed by Congress as of Jan. 3, 2007, and it is this version that is published here.”

However, the long codification process by The office of the Law Revision Counsel (LRC) starts very quickly after any new legislation with “classification” to corresponding US Code sections. They put these in “Classification Tables” and make them available to us all at http://uscode.house.gov/classification/tables.shtml

Hmmm, doesn’t sound too “obscure” to me.

I seriously doubt if Judge Robertson ever saw that letter or even knows it exists perhaps. I don’t know this to be a fact, but I am pretty sure mail to federal judges and other high ranking officials would be opened and inspected by some type of law enforcement. I would suspect this is probably standard procedure for most high rankng government and judicial officials mail since 9/11.

If this alleged story is factual, I’d love to hear the two U.S. Marshals version of this story.

Honestly, not sure what point you are trying to make. So if the court has occasionally cited Vattel’s views on international law in certain matters, it means it will look to Vattel to define natural born citizen. Not a very convincing argument particularly when one considers the court and almost all significant authority in the early republic rejected Vattel’s definitions of native or natural born.

Don’t understand citation to Fong. Case involved expelling aliens, didn’t define native-born and cited sections of Vattel other than § 212. Ironically, this opinion was written by the same Justice Gray who expressly rejected § 212 of Law of Nations in Wong Kim Ark argued by the dissent and based his holding on the fact that all children born in the US had always been native-born citizens regardless of parentage.

The Venus involved a dispute of internation law and hence it is not surprising that Vattel was cited. The case had nothing to do with who was native-born and Vattel is cited to define who is a domicile. With respect to American law, Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Murray v. The Charming Betsy that persons born within the United States were citizens.

My point was simply that it has been repeately argued all over the blogisphere that the founders used “natural born citizen” because the term was well known from the Law of Nations. This is simply not true as it wasn’t in an english translation at that time. If you want to argue that they intended Vattel’s meaning and used a term that wasn’t in Law of Nations at the time, you will need to cite some contemporary authority to such effect. However, most authority contradicts this.

Honestly, not sure what point you are trying to make. So if the court has occasionally cited Vattel’s views on international law in certain matters, it means it will look to Vattel to define natural born citizen. Not a very convincing argument particularly when one considers the court and almost all significant authority in the early republic rejected Vattel’s definitions of native or natural born.

Don’t understand citation to Fong. Case involved expelling aliens, didn’t define native-born and cited sections of Vattel other than § 212. Ironically, this opinion was written by the same Justice Gray who expressly rejected § 212 of Law of Nations in Wong Kim Ark argued by the dissent and based his holding on the fact that all children born in the US had always been native-born citizens regardless of parentage.

The Venus involved a dispute of internation law and hence it is not surprising that Vattel was cited. The case had nothing to do with who was native-born and Vattel is cited to define who is a domicile. With respect to American law, Chief Justice Marshall made clear in Murray v. The Charming Betsy that persons born within the United States were citizens.

My point was simply that it has been repeately argued all over the blogisphere that the founders used “natural born citizen” because the term was well known from the Law of Nations. This is simply not true as it wasn’t in an english translation at that time. If you want to argue that they intended Vattel’s meaning and used a term that wasn’t in Law of Nations at the time, you will need to cite some contemporary authority to such effect. However, most authority contradicts this.

The FONG court understood from “The Venus” court’s reference to Vattel that NATIVES, or INDIGENES, were NATIVE CITIZENS. And, a NATIVE CITIZEN is equivalent to a NATURAL BORN CITIZEN.

This CONFIRMS that the SCOTUS will consider Vattel as authority when they determine the meaning of “natural born citizen” as the framers of the Constitution intended it to mean.

The FONG court actually cited “The Venus” court’s reference to Vattel with regard to domicil, and stated the following:

“…in the case of The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253, 278: “The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country, for a special purpose, and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel, domicil, which he defines to be ‘a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there.’ Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society, at least a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of an inferior order from the native citizens; but is, nevertheless, united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicil, he continues, is not established, unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. (Vatt. pp. 92, 93.)”

Please note that the FONG court quoted “The Venus” court’s reference to Vattel, and the FONG court stated the “domicil” is “a kind of citizen of an inferior order from the native citizens”. Yet, the specific quote from “The Venus” court that the FONG court was quoting was as follows: “These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages.”

Please note that the FONG court stated the “domicil” is “a kind of citizen of an inferior order from the native citizens” while ‘The Venus” court stated the domicil is “a kind of citizen of an inferior order…”. Thus, the FONG court, when quoting from “The Venus” court’s reference to Vattel, added the phrase “…from the native citizens” to “The Venus”court’s statement that the “domicil”is “a kind of citizen of an inferior order…”, so that the FONG court’s understanding from Vattel was that a “domicil” was “a kind of citizen of an inferior order… …from the native citizens”.

Thus, the FONG court understood from “The Venus” court’s reference to Vattel’s Law of Nations that NATIVES, or INDIGENES, were NATIVE CITIZENS, which is equivalent to NATURAL BORN CITIZENS.

Moreover, “The Venus” court stated that Vattel “is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands”. Then, “The Venus” court quoted Vattel’s definition of citizens and stated, “the citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.”

Please note that the NATIVES, or INDIGENES, or NATIVE CITIZENS, which is equivalent to “NATURAL BORN CITIZENS” are “those born in the country, of parents who are citizens.” Obama does NOT meet this definition. Hence, per the SCOTUS in FONG, and per the SCOTUS in “The Venus”, Obama is NOT a NATIVE, or INDIGENE, or NATIVE CITIZEN, or NATURAL BORN CITIZEN of the United States, and thus Obama is NOT eligible to be the President of the United States.

Specifically “The Venus Court stated the following:

“Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says, ‘the citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.’ ‘The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are strangers who are permitted to settle and stay in the country. Bound by their residence to the society, they are subject to the laws of the state, while they reside there, and they are obliged to defendit, because it grants them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the laws, or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages.’”

FONG YUE TING v. UNITED STATES. WONG QUAN V. UNITED STATES. LEE JOE V. UNITED STATES., 13 S. Ct. 1016, 149 U.S. 698 (U.S. 05/15/1893)

[1] SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

[96] That those who have become domiciled in a country are entitled to a more distinct and larger measure of protection than those who are simply passing through, or temporarily in it, has long been recognized by the law of nations. It was said by this court, in the case of The Venus, 8 Cranch, 253, 278: “The writers upon the law of nations distinguish between a temporary residence in a foreign country, for a special purpose, and a residence accompanied with an intention to make it a permanent place of abode. The latter is styled by Vattel, domicil, which he defines to be ‘a habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there.’ Such a person, says this author, becomes a member of the new society, at least a permanent inhabitant, and is a kind of citizen of an inferior order from the native citizens; but is, nevertheless, united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages. This right of domicil, he continues, is not established, unless the person makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. (Vatt. pp. 92, 93.) Grotius nowhere uses the word domicil, but he also distinguishes between those who stay in a foreign country by the necessity of their affairs, or from any other temporary cause, and those who reside there from a permanent cause. The former he denominates strangers, and the latter subjects.” The rule is thus laid down by Sir Robert Phillimore: “It has been said that these rules of law are applicable to naturalized as well as native citizens. But there is a class of persons which cannot be, strictly speaking, included under either of these denominations, namely, the class of those who have ceased to reside in their native country, and have taken up a permanent abode . . . in another. These are domiciled inhabitants; they have not put on a new citizenship through some formal made enjoined by the law of the new country. They are de facto though not de jure citizens of the country of their domicil.” 1 Phillimore, International Law, Chap. XVIII, p. 347.

U.S. Supreme Court THE VENUS, 12 U.S. 253 (1814)

As this question is not only decisive of many claims now depending before this Court, but is also of vast importance to our merchants generally, I may be excused for stating, at some length, the reasons on which my opinion is founded.

The whole system of decisions applicable to this subject, rests on the law of nations as its base. It is, therefore, of some importance to enquire how far the writers on that law consider the subjects of one power residing within the territory of another, as retaining their original character, or partaking of the character of the nation in which they reside.

Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says, ‘the citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.’ ‘The inhabitants, as distinguished from citizens, are strangers who are permitted to settle and stay in the country. Bound by their residence to the society, they are subject to the laws of the state, while they reside there, and they are obliged to defendit, because it grants

[Page 12 U.S. 253, 290]

them protection, though they do not participate in all the rights of citizens. They enjoy only the advantages which the laws, or custom gives them. The perpetual inhabitants are those who have received the right of perpetual residence. These are a kind of citizens of an inferior order, and are united and subject to the society, without participating in all its advantages.’ ‘The domicil is the habitation fixed in any place, with an intention of always staying there. A man does not, then, establish his domicil in any place, unless he makes sufficiently known his intention of fixing there, either tacitly or by an express declaration. However, this declaration is no reason why, if he afterwards changes his mind, he may not remove his domicil elsewhere. In this sense, he who stops, even for a long time, in a place, for the management of his affairs, has only a simple habitation there, but has no domicil.’

A domicil, then, in the sense in which this term is used by Vattel, requires not only actual residence in a foreign country, but ‘an intention of always staying there.’ Actual residence without this intention, amounts to no more than ’simple habitation.’

Although this intention may be implied without being expressed, it ought not, I think, to be implied, to the injury of the individual, from acts entirely equivocal. If the stranger has not the power of making his residence perpetual, if circumstances, after his arrival in a country, so change, as to make his continuance there disadvantageous to himself, and his power to continue, doubtful; ‘an intention always to stay there’ ought not, I think, to be fixed upon him, in consequence of an unexplained residence previous to that change of circumstances. Mere residence, under particular circumstances, would seem to me, at most, to prove only an intention to remain so long as those circumstances continue the same, or equally advantageous. This does not give a domicil. The intention which gives a domicil is an unconditional intention ‘to stay always.’

Your above statement. Guess you didn’t see this, huh? I’ll post only two articles, but I have many more if you would like for me to post them?

http://www.rcfp.org/news/documents/ssprotest.html
Protest letter to the U.S. Secret Service
“The Reporters Committee objected to the interrogation of a journalist by Secret Service agents over a satirical editorial asking Jesus to ’smite’ the President.” (Bush)

OR this.

http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/04/washington/04cheney.html?_r=1
Man Sues Secret Service Agent Over Arrest After Approaching Cheney and Denouncing War
“DENVER, Oct. 3 — A Colorado man who was arrested in June on harassment charges after he approached Vice President Dick Cheney to denounce the war in Iraq filed a federal lawsuit on Tuesday accusing a Secret Service agent of civil rights violations.”

Phil, this is my point. This is what the Secret Service, U.S. Marshals, Sheriffs, Police, etc. are suppose to do when someone turns in a possible threat to our elected officials or judges; “investigate the possible threat that was made and evaluate if it is a valid threat.” This is their job. If they don’t investigate and harm came to the person that was threatened; then the news media would be reporting loudly that the Secret Service, U.S. Marshals, Sheriffs, Police, etc. “were not doing their jobs.” These guys are in a no win situation.(law enforcement.)

The above two articles regarding Bush/Cheney reflects perhaps when the people aren’t guilty but was taken too far by law enforcement? (Bush/Cheney)

From the story posted here, it appears that the alleged two U.S. Marshals who visited Jesse H. Merrell, were “investigating the threat.” Sounds to me, from the story, that the two U.S. Marshals determined that there was not a valid threat. If they had determined that the threat was valid, then Mr. Merrell would have been arrested. However, I still feel the story is suspect.

“Vattel, who, though not very full to this point, is more explicit and more satisfactory on it than any other whose work has fallen into my hands, says, “the citizens are the members of the civil society; bound to this society by certain duties, and subject to its authority, they equally participate in its advantages. The natives, or indigenes, are those born in the country, of parents who are citizens. Society not being able to subsist and to perpetuate itself but by the children of the citizens, those children naturally follow the condition of their fathers, and succeed to all their rights.”

Notice anything strange? Gee, the phrase “natural born citizen” is missing and is replaced by “indigines.” The phrase “natural born citizen” was not in the original english transaction of Vattel’s Law of Nations and as far as I know did not appear until the 1797 translation, a decade after the convetion. Kind of cuts the legs out from under Donofrio’s arguments, don’t you think?